Every breach that
legacy MFA couldn't stop,
but MFA 2.0 would have.

Stolen credentials let attackers into Advanced, the NHS software supplier. Live session tokens then enabled ransomware that disrupted hospitals and ambulance services. Device-bound keys would have stopped the first step.

Conti reached Costa Rican government systems through compromised remote-access credentials. The resulting session tokens required no further proof, enabling ransomware deployment across agencies.

Attackers used stolen employee credentials to reach Costa Rica's social security agency without a second factor. The resulting sessions allowed direct lateral movement and encryption.

Nelnet disclosed exposure of borrower records but supplied no entry method. Without a documented login or token, no authentication factor can be evaluated.

Attackers queried an unprotected internal endpoint that returned email addresses and phone numbers with zero authentication checks. No credentials, sessions, or MFA factors were involved at any point.

Attackers used stolen credentials for direct login to Shutterfly systems, then operated inside an active session that required no further checks for data theft or ransomware deployment.

Attackers brute-forced an unprotected GPRS testing gateway, then used active sessions to reach customer databases. Device-bound credentials would have eliminated the remote credential attack surface on the first hop.

ShinyHunters reached Kering records through reused credentials that produced a reusable session token. Device-bound keys would have blocked that first login because signatures must come from hardware the attacker never…

Attackers drained Cream Finance pools through manipulated collateral checks inside smart contracts. No credentials or second factors existed for any authentication layer to protect.

A single phone call to Robinhood support granted attackers access to seven million customer records. Device-bound credentials would have made that transfer impossible.

REvil reached JBS plants through valid remote access credentials and later moved laterally with harvested sessions. Device-bound signatures would have blocked the first step.

REvil reached 1,500+ organizations through a zero-day that let malicious updates run without credentials or MFA. Device-bound keys cannot close a flaw that sits before any login step occurs.

Attackers scraped 533 million Facebook records through a Contact Importer endpoint that accepted queries without verifying any relationship to the requested data. No login occurred.

DarkSide used a single reused password from a dormant VPN account to reach Colonial Pipeline's network. No second factor existed at login, giving attackers an authenticated session they used to deploy ransomware.

APT29 reached SolarWinds through password spraying on weak admin accounts. Once inside the build system they inserted SUNBURST, then used stolen SAML signing keys to forge access across customer environments.

A shared TeamViewer password let an attacker reach the SCADA workstation and change sodium hydroxide setpoints. Device-bound credentials would have required the enrolled hardware itself, not a reusable secret.

Phishing delivered malware that stole already-authenticated sessions at CNA Financial. Device-bound credentials would have blocked the initial foothold that made later movement possible.

Attackers gained Tchap access by convincing a user or support process to hand over an account. Legacy second factors attached to that account offered no protection once control transferred.

Attackers obtained Workday-linked CRM access by persuading employees to supply credentials over calls. Device-bound credentials close this vector because no readable secret exists to transfer.

Lapsus$ used previously stolen passwords to log into Microsoft, Samsung, and Ubisoft. The resulting SAML tokens granted broad access across federated systems without additional authentication.

Lapsus$ used stolen employee credentials to log directly into Nvidia systems and exfiltrate source code. The login produced reusable sessions with no hardware boundary.

Attackers socially engineered an Okta employee for credentials and live approval to the support portal, exposing customer tenant metadata without taking federation tokens or customer sessions.